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Taking Account of Environmental Damage1 
 
Prof. Colin T. Reid 
 
Historically the law has largely ignored the environment.  Legal rights and duties have been 
confined to a restricted range of interests, essentially protecting only individuals and their 
property.  Even property interests have been approached in a narrow way, concentrating on 
those which can be viewed in financial terms.  Thus the various features of land have been 
recognised only so far as they might affect its selling price, and forests valued only according 
to the value of timber as a commodity.  Now there is a growing desire to identify and 
recognise the many ways in which we benefit from the natural environment and to find a 
place for this in our legal relationships.  That task is not straightforward and this paper seeks 
to explore two possible routes and the challenges they present. 
 
 The first route is to retain the law’s focus on persons and property, but to expand the 
categories of interests which are accepted as affecting their well-being and value.  Thus it 
may be possible to recognise that an individual has been harmed not just when they have 
suffered a physical injury but when they are deprived of aesthetic or spiritual benefits from 
the environment.  Or likewise that a farm has been damaged when activities on neighbouring 
land remove the pollinating insects the have been providing beneficial, but unrewarded, 
services to the crops on the farm.  This approach does not require a restructuring of legal 
categories but raises major factual and evidential challenges. 
 
 The second route is to change the focus of the law completely and look at the 
environment as something which can itself hold rights and interests which the law will 
protect.  In this way damage to an ecosystem is not considered merely in terms of what harm 
is caused to people and their property, but rather in the light of how the ecosystem itself has 
been harmed.  This does require a significant re-orientation of the law, recognising new 
categories of legal interests and presenting challenges of form and procedure as well as again 
raising factual and evidential issues.   
 
A third option, not considered fully here, can be seen as a variation of the first route, 
but placing the focus on human rights.  It is now commonplace for legal systems to grant 
protection not just to the health and property of individuals, but also to their human rights.  
To the extent at these are defined as including the right to live in a clean environment2 there 
is scope to use this as a means of treating harm to the environment as constituting a legally 
recognised harm,  to individuals.  There are, however, difficulties in identifying when harm is 
so severe as to amount to a breach of human rights – clearly not every departure from a 
pristine environment will count.  There are also difficulties in attributing liability between the 
state, which is responsible for guaranteeing the rights, and other actors whose activities may 
be the direct cause of the harm but do not generally owe the same sort of duty to respect all 
the human rights of fellow citizens.  Moreover, although this is not the case in Chile, many 
constitutions treat environmental rights as different from the more immediate rights such as 
personal liberty which can be the focus of direct vindication in the courts,.  In Spain, for 
example, the “right to enjoy an environment suitable for personal development” 3 is within 
                                                 
1 This overview is a talk presented at the international seminar on Ecosystems, Ecosystem Services and 
Environmental Jurisdiction, organised by the Third Environmental Court and Universidad Austral in Valdivia, 
Chile in November 2014. 
2 Art.19(8) of the Constitution of Chile. 
3 Art.45 of the Constitution of Spain 
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the section of the Constitution dealing with “Governing Principles of Economic and Social 
Policy”, not those providing “Fundamental Rights and Public Liberties” nor the “Rights and 
Duties of Citizens”.  Approaching environmental harm as a human rights issue thus has 
potential but also pitfalls. 
 
 Whatever approach is taken, there are some questions to ask about the overall 
objectives, which will affect the path to be followed.  Is the aim to deal with the few very 
major incidents which have devastating environmental effects, with the greater number of 
less significant but still serious incidents, or with the many more lesser incidents which are 
individually less significant though still noticeable but which cumulatively have a greater 
effect than the higher profile incidents,.  Or is the aim to stretch the law even further to 
capture the mass of diffuse pollution which is degrading the environment every day?  Is the 
regime seen as playing a major role in changing behaviour, or is that task reserved for more 
direct regulatory approaches, with liability for damage filling a gap when things go wrong?  
Is this form of legal intervention viewed as something for public authorities to use or is it 
intended to open up direct action on the part of a much wider range of society?  How these 
questions are answered will have a big impact on the scope and structure of what is 
developed, as will the legal context within which it has to sit.  This paper does not provide an 
answer, but tries to provide a guide to some of the steps that need to be taken in working 
towards an answer. 
 
 
Adding the Environment to Established Structures 
 
One way of taking account of the environment is to build on existing patterns of liability but 
to extend them so that they include environmental harms within the scope of the damage that 
is recognised as having legal consequences.  There is an example of a similar process in the 
jurisdictions in the British Commonwealth where over the past century and more the concept 
of personal injury has been expanded to take account of nervous shock or psychiatric injury, 
which was previously not regarded as a form of harm that the law should recognise.  This has 
not involved any reworking of the fundamental rules of the law of tort and delict, just an 
extension of the range of consequences counted as legally relevant harm. 
 
 Over the years, the things that we value and the ways in which they can harmed have 
changed massively.  This is partly a matter of scientific advances, as we develop a better 
understanding of the many different ways in which activities formerly thought to be 
innocuous can harm us.  But it is also partly a question of changing attitudes, values and 
expectations.  Accommodation that is today regarded as falling below an acceptable level 
would in the past have been seen as perfectly adequate, whilst the elements that contribute to 
valuable intellectual property have expanded greatly in recent decades.  In such cases, the 
point at which we would say that someone’s interests have been harmed has moved 
significantly.  The law follows these developments and embraces the new ways of seeing 
things.   
 
As a gross generalisation, such evolution is probably easier in a civil law country than 
a common law one.  In the former the foundation of the law on principles stated in more 
general terms makes it easier for these to be applied to new situations and to embrace new 
ways of thinking about what is included within the established structures of the law.  Thus 
where the Civil Code simply provides that anyone who has wrongfully caused harm should 
3 
 
provide compensation for that harm4 it is comparatively simple for the law to follow the 
expansion of what is generally considered as being “harm”.  In the common law countries, 
which take a more fragmented approach to delict or torts and rely more on previous 
precedent, breaking away from the established views can be harder, but can still be achieved.  
That process has lessons for the embracing of new ideas of value and harm, under whichever 
sort of legal system. 
 
The growing mass of research and literature on ecosystem services and the economic 
value of the environment (e.g. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity programme) 
shows that there are significant, but previously overlooked, ways in which harm to the 
environment causes harm to human well-being and property.  But such adverse consequences 
are not recognised as harm within the established legal categories.  The same was the case 
over a century ago in relation to the psychiatric harm caused by being involved in traumatic 
incidents,5 but now such harm is fully accepted and qualifies the victim for compensation.  
There are several stages that have to be gone through before such an evolution is complete. 
 
In the first place the courts must be willing to accept that the “new” form of harm 
exists and is worthy of recognition.  This will be based on scientific evidence which can be 
tested in court, but is also affected by the views in society more widely.  Judges will demand 
evidence that can be tested, but inevitably are affected by perceptions in the wider 
community, both scientific and public.  The courts are never at the leading edge of accepting 
new ideas but both influence and are influenced by the wider progression of an idea from 
being absurd, to being an interesting alternative insight, to being possibly correct, to being 
probably correct, to being accepted knowledge – the gradual acceptance of plate tectonics and 
continental drift within the scientific and public communities is a good example.  With 
ecosystem services and their valuation we are now a long way down the path to acceptance, 
so that it would not be a great leap for a court to include ecosystem valuations in its 
accounting for the harm caused. 
 
Acceptance of the general principle, though, is only the first step in arriving at a 
workable legal response to a new form of harm.  A threshold must be established for when 
the harm is serious enough to deserve legal attention.  It is not every discomfort which is 
recognised as a personal injury giving rise to a claim for compensation, nor every external 
incident which may in some way affect the value of a person’s property.  In relation to 
psychiatric injury the boundary has largely been set at the point where a feeling of 
discomfort, fear or anxiety becomes more than just a passing emotion and constitutes a 
recognised psychiatric disorder.  This sets the boundary quite high, as people’s lives can be 
significantly affected before they reach that level of distress.  In the environmental context, 
what level of disruption to ecosystem services is required before an actionable wrong has 
occurred? 
 
A further step is to identify the range of victims who are going to be able to raise an 
action.  Except for cases such as air pollution, where a physical injury is involved, the range 
of potential claimants is usually fairly limited by the fact that a collision, or even an 
explosion, can affect only those in the immediate vicinity.  With psychiatric injury the range 
is considerably expanded and the law has struggled to find the appropriate boundary.  
Obviously the person at the centre of an incident can be accepted as a primary victim, and 
                                                 
4 E.g. Chilean Code, art.2314. 
5 Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 App Cas 222 
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this has been extended to immediate witnesses, but there has been more uncertainty over how 
far to go beyond that.  What about a family member seeing live on television an incident, e.g. 
the collapse of a stand at a sports stadium, where they fear that a relative may be involved?  
What about a person seeing news coverage of a ship sinking and not knowing if their loved 
one was one of those rescued?  What about a relative simply being informed that their father 
or daughter has been killed or injured?  The ripples of an incident spread widely, but there 
must be a limit to liability somewhere.  In relation to environmental harm, this may be a 
particular problem, given that all aspects of our environment are connected.  How distant 
from the primary consequences can a victim be but still claim compensation - distant in 
space, time and number of links in the chain of causation? 
 
There are also going to be practical and procedural problems.  A major practical issue 
may be proving causation.  A spill of chemicals that visibly pollutes river is easy to establish, 
but where groundwater is polluted, the effects may appear only at a distance in time and 
space and there may be more than one possible source so that identifying the one responsible 
may be difficult.  Moreover there is likely to be more than one contributing factor to a decline 
in water quality, so that establishing that any one of them is responsible to a legally 
recognisable degree may be even more challenging.  And if there are several contributing 
factors, how is responsibility to be shared, especially if only some of them involve activity 
which will attract liability at all?  
 
 At a procedural level there is the question of who can come to court to 
represent whose interests.  If the drinking water for a town is affected, does each individual 
have a claim or should there be a collective claim taken by the municipality or some other 
representative body?  If so, how does one assess the loss and ensure that the true victims see a 
benefit from the compensation paid or other remedial action taken?  This may point towards 
remedies that actually seek to restore the ecosystem services rather than merely pay 
compensation, but that can be a slow and complicated process, which raises further questions 
of how this is to be monitored and enforced over the years to come.  The solutions will differ 
depending on whether the wrong-doers take direct responsibility for remediation work or 
meet their obligations by providing money and passing the responsibility on to others.  And if 
a municipality or other public body is acting on behalf of its community, will community 
members have any recourse if they consider that the remedial work is not being done?  A 
further complication is that the success of attempts at the restoration of ecosystems is rarely 
guaranteed.  The same can be said of many medical interventions, but there we have so much 
more experience that the degree of risk can usually be calculated and taken into account, 
whereas with environmental restoration, we are still at the very early days of developing our 
expertise and understanding, and the results take much longer to become apparent. 
 
These challenges, though, are ones that can be met within the existing structures of 
the law.  Recognising new forms of harm does not require fundamental reworking of legal 
concepts or relationships, just the application of established principles to new sets of 
circumstances, a task which is within the reach of a court willing to break out of restrictive 
past thinking. 
   
 
 




The alternative to trying to embrace wider concepts of harm within the existing legal 
structures is to establish a new approach that places the environment at its core.  This builds 
on the view that harm to the environment is itself a wrong which needs to be remedied, rather 
than merely something to be tackled only because of its impact (however widely defined) on 
people and their property.  The environment, though, cannot appear in court itself and 
therefore a number of challenges must be faced in creating a regime that will provide 
remedies for environmental damage.  A number of attempts have been made around the 
world and what follows looks at the EU’s Environmental Liability Directive,6 not because it 
has got things right, but because it is a concrete example which highlights the key points 
which any regime must address. 
 
The Directive’s regime is based on public authorities being able to take action in the event of 
certain serious forms of environmental harm being caused or threatened.  There is a role for 
the wider public but only the designated authorities have legal powers to act.  The remedies 
are not about compensation but about trying to ensure that the environment is restored, or in 
the event that this is not possible, that equivalent environmental benefits are provided.  It 
operates within the complex framework of EU environmental law and therefore can build on 
a sophisticated background of definitions and existing obligations, but it has still had to tackle 
anew the challenges of dealing directly with environmental damage. 
 
What damage is recognised? 
 
One initial question is to determine the scope of any liability regime.  What sort of 
environmental damage will be recognised?  Everything we do has some impact on the 
environment, usually adverse, whilst depending on one’s perspective some impacts may be 
either good or bad, e.g. expanding woodland habitat at the expense of rich grassland.  The 
Directive concentrates on serious harm and to do this makes use of definitions used in other 
parts of EU environmental law.  It covers: 
- water damage: this is based on impacts which have a significant adverse effect on the 
ecological, chemical or quantitative status of water under the Water Framework Directive,7 
which sets detailed parameters for all water bodies using five categories: high, good, 
moderate, poor and bad.  In essence it is only pollution or other incidents which threaten to 
move a body of water from one status to a lower one which will trigger the liability 
provisions. 
- land damage: this is based on any contamination of land which creates a significant risk of 
human health being adversely affected, again a fairly high threshold calling for impacts much 
more severe than those which may create a significant nuisance.  This definition also means 
that the focus has not wholly shifted away from the effects on people as being the key 
concern of the law. 
- biodiversity damage: this is based on significant adverse effects on a protected species or 
habitat reaching or maintaining favourable conservation status, building on the EU Birds and 
Habitats Directives and the supporting guidance and case-law to identify what is protected 
and explain when its conservation status is favourable. 
 
The Directive thus largely uses existing quality standards to measure which harms will be 
tackled.  For water and biodiversity damage a further consequence of doing so is that this 
helps to get round the major practical difficulty of measuring the impact of any incident, 
                                                 
6 Dir. 2004/35/CE. 
7  Dir.2000/60/EC. 
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since there should be benchmark data already to hand detailing the previous state of the 
environment, prepared for the classification of waters the designation of habitats and species 
and their monitoring under the law. 
 
Who is entitled to take action? 
 
The Directive is firmly rooted in public law.  The power to invoke its provisions and the 
control over what exactly must be done is placed in the hands of the public bodies specified 
for this purpose by each Member State.  When and how its provisions are used therefore 
depends on the willingness and capacity of the designated “competent authority” to discover 
and respond to relevant incidents.  Such an approach should ensure consistency and avoids 
the risk of a proliferation of different actions taken by different individuals and bodies.  It 
also ensures that industrial operators have just the one, clearly identified body to deal with.  
 
However the wider public are not wholly ignored.  Any person who is or is likely to be 
affected by environmental damage and non-governmental organisations promoting 
environmental protection have the right to approach the designated authority asking it to take 
action.  Such requests cannot be ignored and the authority must either begin to take action or 
if it decides not to, provide reasons for this decision.  This decision must then be susceptible 
to review in the courts or by whatever other independent review procedures the national legal 
system allows.  In this way, the public authorities’ monopoly of action is preserved, but the 
public can prompt action and have a guaranteed way of taking things further if they think that 
any authority is not fulfilling its responsibilities. 
 
  
Who is bound by the Directive? 
 
A further element of the scope of the Directive is establishing who is bound by its provisions.  
Here two different approaches are adopted,  For water and land damage, the Directive’s 
provisions apply only to those undertaking specific activities, in effect those already subject 
to environmental control under existing EU law, listed in Annex III of the Directive – 
industrial processes, waste management and disposal, transport of hazardous substances, 
water discharges, use of genetically modified organisms, etc.  The liability provisions 
therefore attach to activities which are already subject to substantial controls which, if 
observed, should largely eliminate the risk of damage being caused.   
 
For biodiversity damage, there is no such limitation and all “occupational activities” are 
covered, essentially excluding purely domestic activities, which should pose little threat of 
causing significant harm.  This wider reach is, however balanced by narrower rules on 
liability. 
 
What obligations are created? 
 
The operator responsible for causing relevant environmental damage is bound to take 
remedial steps as set out in the Directive.  There is also potential for direct action to be taken 
by the authorities and for them to recover the cost from the operator.  The Directive, though, 
is not just based on retrospective liability but also deals with imminent threats of harm.  In 
such circumstances the operator is bound to take the necessary preventive action to prevent 




What is the basis of liability? 
 
The degree of fault required to create liability is another major element in any liability 
regime.  Here the Directive adopts two paths.  For the operators of Annex III activities (see 
above), liability is strict for all forms of environmental damage.  Liability without fault is 
often viewed as being unfair, but that can be countered in this case by the fact that since the 
operators here are already subject to more direct and far-reaching environmental controls they 
clearly know of the risks of their activities and have been given clear rules to follow to 
minimise this, a point picked up in the exceptions discussed below. 
 
For biodiversity damage, liability extends beyond the Annex III operators, but is restricted to 
cases where there is fault or negligence.  This has more in common with the standard rules of 
delict and reflects the balance of interests seen in the wider law.  It can be argued either that 
this is offering biodiversity insufficient protection, or that this is a fair approach given the 
much wider range of activities which can lead to relevant harm, the fact that many of these 
involved are not alerted to environmental risks in the same way as the Annex III operators, 
and the fact that it may be easier for a less blatant incident to cause biodiversity damage that 
crosses the threshold for liability than is the case for water or land damage. 
 
Exceptions   
 
The rules on liability must be considered in the light of a number of exceptions which qualify 
their application in ways which affect the overall balance of the scheme.  Aside from 
exceptions to prevent duplication with other international legal regimes dealing with nuclear 
incidents and marine oil spills, other limitations ensure that the regime does not catch those 
who might be seen as blameless.  The two most significant exceptions (which States could 
choose to apply or not) allow operators to escape liability firstly where they have not been 
negligent and where the activity was not considered to create a risk of environmental damage 
according to the state of knowledge at the time (the “state of the art” defence) or secondly, in 
the case of an Annex III activity, if it was being carried out in full accordance with the 
national rules implemented to give effect to the EU laws governing that activity (the “permit” 
defence).  In these cases the application of strict liability is overridden by the fact that as far 
as the operators knew at the time, they were not undertaking a risky activity, or if they were, 
they were following all the rules to ensure that no risk arose. 
 
Other exceptions limit the scope of liability in other ways.  Some, such as exempting the 
consequences of armed conflict or exceptional natural phenomena are commonplace in 
liability regimes, but one other has a significant effect in limiting the scope of the regime.  
This excludes cases of diffuse pollution, unless a link can be shown between the damage and 
the activities of individual operators.  This emphasises that the regime is limited to specific 
incidents which can be shown to have a direct and substantial impact on the environment, 
rather that opening a route to tackle the more diffuse degradation of the environment caused 
by modern life. 
 
What remedy must be provided? 
 
The focus on the environment is perhaps most obviously shown in the remedies.  The 
Directive is not about providing compensation to people or restoring their private property.  
Instead it is about restoring the environment – “the purpose of primary remediation is to 
restore the damaged natural resources and/or services to, or towards, baseline condition”.  
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Where this is not possible, “complementary” remediation must be undertaken on another site 
so as to provide a similar level of natural resources and services, and if there is to be a time-
lag while the restoration is achieved, then “compensatory” remediation must be undertaken to 
make up for the interim loss of resources and services pending restoration.  The 
environmental goal is thus very clear and the only purpose for which remediation is to be 
taken.  The practical problems of knowing what the baseline condition was should be eased 
by the nature and definition of the forms of damage covered, certainly for water and 
biodiversity damage where there is a link with other measures which will have already 
required some classification or designation, based on assessments of the condition of the 
resource.  Responsibility for determining what is required is placed in the hands of the 
designated public authority, so that it is clear who is setting the requirements and that this is 
not left in the hands of the responsible party to assess. 
 
 
The EU’s Environmental Liability Directive establishes a liability regime which has the 
environment at its heart.  Aspects such as the definition of when land is contaminated mean 
that it is not wholly eco-centric, but the focus of the law, and particularly of the remedies is 
completely different from what we see in conventional systems of civil liability where it is 





Taking account of environmental damage can be achieved in different ways.  The existing 
legal approaches can be extended to recognise that harm can be caused in ways beyond those 
currently recognised, or a wholly novel set of legal relationships can be created that places 
the focus firmly on the environment itself.  Whatever approach is taken, there will be 
substantial challenges in relation to evidence and procedure.  It is unlikely that it will be 
possible to resolve all of these at once and the best approach may be to accept that this is an 
area where gradual evolution is best.  By making use of the growing scientific literature on 
ecosystem services and the valuing the environment, some steps can be made where the 
position is most clear or the need most obvious, and the lessons learned there applied later to 
a wider range of circumstances.  Such gradual development not only allows opportunities for 
testing the best way of handling issues, but also gives time for all concerned to come to terms 
with the change in thinking embodied here.  If the change can be presented as evolution 
rather than revolution, it may have more chance of success. 
 
 
 
 
